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Abstract
Invoking large transmit antenna arrays, massive MIMO wiretap settings are capable of suppressing
passive eavesdroppers via narrow beamforming towards legitimate terminals. This implies that secrecy
is obtained almost for free in these settings. We show that this property holds not only for fully digital
MIMO architectures, but also in massive MIMO settings whose transmitters employ architectures with
reduced complexity. The investigations consider two dominant approaches for complexity reduction,
namely antenna selection and hybrid analog-digital precoding. We show that using either approach, the
information leakage normalized by the achievable sum-rate vanishes as the transmit array size grows
large. For both approaches, the decaying speed is determined. The results demonstrate that, as the
transmit array size grows large, the normalized leakages obtained by antenna selection and hybrid analog-
digital precoding converge to zero double-logarithmically and logarithmically, respectively. These analytic
derivations are confirmed for various benchmark architectures through numerical investigations.
Index Terms
Massive MIMO systems, physical layer security, antenna selection, hybrid analog-digital precoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring security and privacy of data during transmission is generally a core issue in wireless
networks. This issue is more dominant in future wireless networks, i.e., 5G and beyond. In fact,
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2due to the increasing demand of data rate, these networks are planned to have prominent features,
such as high spectral efficiency, low latency and reduced cost. Consequently, they are expected
to support diversified services, such as e-health, e-banking, and e-learning [2]–[7]. These services
require higher levels of privacy and security which imply additional secrecy challenges.
Traditional approaches based on cryptographic techniques at the higher layers utilize compli-
cated key generation and distribution methods to provide reliability, security and data integrity
[8]. Nevertheless, staggering growth in the number of smart devices with powerful computational
capabilities surmounts the conventional cryptographic approaches and a new paradigm under
the generic term of physical layer security has emerged as an complementary solution. The
physical layer security approach, which relies on properties of the underlying wireless medium,
exploits imperfections of the radio channel to provide a well-integrated secure platform for
communication [9].
The seminal work of Wyner fundamentally laid an information-theoretic foundation of physical
layer security by proving that in a point-to-point wiretap channel secure data transmission is
achievable without secret key sharing, as long as the quality of the channel to the legitimate user
is better than the one to the eavesdropper [10]. Since then, physical layer security has been studied
in a much broader scale, and the viewpoint of Wyner has been applied to more general scenarios
[11]–[13]. Some examples are the non-degraded versions of broadcast channels [14], the Gaussian
wiretap channels [15], and relay channels [16]. The analysis has been further extended to fading
channels [17], [18] and multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap
settings [19], [20], in the more recent literature.
A. Secrecy Robustness of Massive MIMOME Systems
Recently, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems have received a great deal
of attention [21]–[23]. Employing these systems in the initial version of 5G New Radio (5G
NR) by 3GPP has further highlighted the importance of this technology for the next generations
of wireless networks [24]. Beside unprecedented enhancement in spectral and energy efficiency,
deploying a large number of antennas at the transmitter or receiver can provide promising secrecy
opportunities. Specifically, a transmitter with a large antenna array is capable of narrowing the
radiation beam pattern towards intended receivers, and hence attenuating the signal power in
other diretions [25], [26]. In this case, a simple eavesdropper which is located outside the beam
point receives almost no signal. This means that in this case a secure end-to-end transmission is
3achieved by utilizing the so-called favorable propagation property which guarantees asymptotic
orthogonality of massive MIMO channels [27], [28].
The robustness of massive MIMOME settings against passive eavesdropping was initially
demonstrated for not-too-dense networks in [25] via numerical investigations, and later in [26]
analytically. The impact of passive eavesdropping on the secrecy performance in dense networks
was investigated in [29]. Massive MIMOME settings with active malicious terminals were further
studied in [26], [30]. For these settings, secrecy performance was shown to be significantly de-
graded. The degradation can be partially compensated by means of artificial noise generation [30].
Similar to other performance gains of massive MIMO, the robustness against passive eavesdrop-
ping is obtained at the expense of high implementational cost and complexity imposed by the large
number of antennas in these systems. As fully digital implementation of massive MIMO systems
does not seem to be tractable in the near future, it is important to answer the following question:
Are massive MIMOME settings with reduced complexity architectures also robust against passive
eavesdropping? The main objective of this work is to answer this question.
B. Massive MIMO Systems with Reduced Complexity
There are two major approaches to reduce the complexity of massive MIMO systems. The
first approach is transmit antenna selection (TAS) in which downlink transmission is carried out
through a subset of transmit antennas [31]–[37]. Some recent studies have demonstrated that in
addition to complexity reduction, TAS can provide performance enhancements in various other
respects; see for example [38]–[41]. The main alternative to TAS for complexity reduction is
hybrid analog-digital precoding (HADP). In this approach, digital precoding is performed over a
reduced number of radio frequency (RF) chains. The outputs of the RF chains are then coupled via
an analog network and transmitted over the transmit antenna array [42]–[45]. Depending on the
cost and complexity constraints, there exist various structures for digital and analog beamforming,
e.g., [46]–[51]. The most extreme case is the single-RF architecture in which the transmit signal
construction is completely performed in the RF domain via the analog network [52]–[54].
Despite the differences, TAS and HADP can be abstractly presented via a unique hybrid
structure. In this structure, the information symbols are first mapped into a low-dimensional
RF signal digitally. The RF signal is then mapped into a signal of higher dimension via analog
beamforming. The TAS and HADP are special instances of such a hybrid structure, where analog
beamforming is realized in these examples via RF switches and phase shifters, respectively.
4C. Contributions and Organization
The main objective of this study is to investigate the robustness of massive MIMOME settings
against passive eavesdropping. We address this objective through the following contributions:
• For a generic hybrid structure, we formulate mathematically the robustness against passive
eavesdropping by introducing the concept of asymptotic secrecy for free. To this end, we
define the relative secrecy cost in a wiretap setting. In settings which are robust against
passive eavesdropping, this metric takes values close to zero.
• Using the proposed formulation, we first investigate massive MIMOME settings under TAS.
We show that even by a fixed number of active transmit antennas and linear digital precoding,
the relative secrecy cost converges to zero proportional to 1/ log logM where M denotes the
total number of transmit antennas. We confirm our analytic derivations by performing various
numerical experiments.
• We then extend the results to massive MIMOME settings with HADP. In this respect, we
derive the relative secrecy cost as a function of system dimension in the large-system limit.
The derivations show that in this case the cost tends to zero proportional to 1/ logM , even
if the hybrid architecture employs only analog beamforming. This analytic result is further
supported via numerical investigations of some benchmark HADP architectures.
The remaining parts of this manuscript are organized as follows: First, we formulate the problem
and specify the system model in Section II. The concept of secrecy for free is then introduced
in Section III. The robustness of massive MIMOME settings against passive eavesdropping is
then investigated under TAS and HADP in Sections IV and V, respectively. Final remarks and
concluding points are further given in Section VI.
D. Notations
Throughout the paper, scalars, vectors and matrices are represented by non-bold, bold lower
case and bold upper case letters, respectively. The set of real numbers is denoted by R and
the complex plane is shown by C. HH, H∗ and HT indicate the Hermitian, complex conjugate
and transpose of H, respectively. log (·) and ln (·) represent the binary and natural logarithms,
respectively. The expected value and variance of x are denoted by E {x} and V {x} , respectively.
The non-negative part of x is shown by [x]+ := max {0, x}. N (η, σ2) and CN (η, σ2) represent
the real and complex Gaussian distributions with mean η and variance σ2, respectively. O (·) is
the big-O notation describing the order of growth. For simplicity, {1, . . . , N} is shortened as [N ].
5II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider secure downlink transmission in a multiuser network with K spatially distributed
legitimate terminals and J eavesdroppers. For sake of tractability, we assume that this network
has a single base station (BS) which is equipped with a transmit antenna array of size M and L
RF chains. The receiving terminals are further assumed to be single-antenna.
A. Channel Model
The downlink channels from the BS to the receiving terminals experiences a quasi-static fading
process. This means that the channel state remains constant during each coherence time interval
which is longer than the transmission time. We focus on transmission in a single frequency sub-
channel whose bandwidth is considerably narrower than the coherence bandwidth of the channels.
This models either a single-carrier narrow-band scenario or a particular sub-carrier of a multi-
carrier system in a wide-band setting.
The system is assumed to operate in standard time-division duplexing (TDD) mode, as it is the
case in MIMO settings with large antenna arrays. This means that the uplink and downlink channels
are reciprocal. Following this reciprocity, the BS estimates the channel state information (CSI) of
the legitimate terminals by exploiting their pilot sequences. These sequences are transmitted in
the uplink training period at the beginning of each coherence time interval. We hence assume that
the BS knows the CSI of the legitimate users. The CSI of the malicious terminals are however
not necessarily available at the BS, as they are overhearing passively.
Following the above illustrations, the uplink channel from the legitimate user k to the BS is
modeled by
√
βk hk for k ∈ [K], where βk is capturing the path-loss and shadowing effects in the
channel, and hk ∈ CM models the fading process. Due to the reciprocity, entries of
√
βkhk also
denote the coefficients of the downlink channel from the BS to legitimate terminal k. Similarly,
the uplink channel from eavesdropper j for j ∈ [J ] is given by √θj gj where θj accounts for the
path-loss and shadowing effect, and gj ∈ CM captures the fading. For sake of brevity, we define
the legitimate uplink channel matrix to be H
√
B and the overhearing uplink channel matrix to
be G
√
Θ, where B := diag (β1, . . . , βK) and Θ := diag (θ1, . . . , θJ) are diagonal matrices, and
H := [h1, . . . ,hK ] , (1a)
G := [g1, . . . , gJ ] . (1b)
For the fading process, we consider the standard Rayleigh model. This means that the entries
of hk and gj for k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [J ] are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
6Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit variance, i.e., hk, gj ∼ CN (0, IM). The
investigations given in the next parts of this paper are straightforwardly extended to various other
models of fading channels. Furthermore, we define the functions F (β) and F (θ) to be the empirical
cumulative distributions of β1, . . . , βK and θ1, . . . , θJ , respectively. We hence use the notation
EF(β) {f (β)} and EF(θ) {f (θ)} to denote respectively the empirical average of f (β1) , . . . , f (βK)
and f (θ1) , . . . , f (θJ).
B. Downlink Transmission via a Hybrid Structure
The BS intends to transmit a confidential message uk ∈
[
2NRk
]
for k ∈ [K] to legitimate
terminal k within N channel uses, such that it is kept secret from the J eavesdroppers. To this end,
the BS first encodes the secret message uk into the codeword [sk (1) , . . . , sk (N)] using encoder
fk,N (·) :
[
2NRk
] 7→ CN . It then maps the vector of encoded symbols in time interval n ∈ [N ],
i.e., s (n) = [s1 (n) , . . . , sK (n)]
T
, into transmit signal x (n) ∈ CM via a generic hybrid structure:
The BS first constructs the base-band transmit signal xBB (n) via a linear digital precoder. Let
wk ∈ CL be the digital beamformer of legitimate terminal k and Pk denote the power allocated to
this terminal. Defining the digital beamforming matrixW = [w1, . . . ,wK ] ∈ CL×K and the power
allocation matrix P = diag (P1, . . . , PK) ∈ RK×K , the base-band transmit signal is compactly
shown as xBB (n) =W
√
P s (n) .
To address the constraint on the transmit power, wk and P are restricted to satisfy ‖wk‖2 = 1
and tr {P} ≤ P for some non-negative real P . Assuming that encoded symbols are distributed
Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance, i.e. sk (n) ∼ CN (0, 1) for k ∈ [K], these restrictions
yield to the following upper bound on the transmit power:
E
{‖xBB (n)‖2} ≤ P. (2)
Using the RF chains, the base-band transmit signal is upconverted to the carrier frequency. The
outputs of these chains are then coupled via analog beamformers fℓ ∈ CM for ℓ ∈ [L]. By defining
the analog precoding matrix F as F := [f1, . . . , fL], the signal transmitted by the BS in the time
interval n is finally written as [44]
x (n) = FW
√
P s (n) . (3)
We assume that the analog network is loss-less meaning that the transmit power after analog
precoding remains the same. Thus, the analog beamformers satisfy ‖fℓ‖2 = 1 for ℓ ∈ [L].
7Considering a standard Gaussian wiretap setting for downlink transmission, the signal received
at legitimate terminal k is written as
yk (n) =
√
βk h
T
kx (n) + vk (n) (4)
for n ∈ [N ], where vk (n) ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the n-th sample of additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at legitimate terminal k. Similarly, the signal overheard by the j-th eavesdropper in the
n-th transmission time interval is given by
zj (n) =
√
θj g
T
j x (n) + bj (n) (5)
where bj (n) ∼ CN (0, ρ2) is the n-th sample of AWGN at eavesdropper j.
C. Special Cases of the Hybrid Structure
Depending on the choice of digital and analog beamformers, the given generic hybrid structure
describes various low-complexity MIMO transmission schemes. In the sequel, we focus on two
well-known techniques, namely TAS and standard HADP. For each of these techniques, the analog
and digital beamforming matrices are of the following forms:
1) TAS: Analog beamforming in TAS is implemented via a switching network. At beginning
of each coherence time interval, a TAS protocol selects L transmit antennas to be active. The
outputs of the RF chains are then connected through the switching network to these antennas for
the given coherence time interval. Let i1 < . . . < iL denote the indices of the selected transmit
antennas. The analog beamformers in this case are sparse vectors with a single non-zero entry, i.e.,
fℓ,m = 1 {m = iℓ}, where 1 {·} denotes the indicator function.
The digital beamformers are further calculated via standard linear precoding, e.g., maximum
ratio transmission (MRT) or regularized zero forcing (RZF), over the reduced channels between
the legitimate terminals and the BS, i.e., h˜k = F
Thk for k ∈ [K]. For instance, in the case of
MRT precoding, digital beamformers are given by wk = h˜
∗
k/‖h˜k‖.
2) HADP: In HADP, analog beamformers are realized via phase-shifters. The most conven-
tional approach for implementation is to use a physical network of analog phase-shifters; see
for example [42], [43], [46]–[48], [55], [56] and references therein. Some recent proposals for
millimeter Wave (mmWave) communications suggest to implement HADP in mmWave spectrum
via reflect- or transmit-arrays, e.g., [57], [58]. Compared to conventional architectures, the latter
structures have shown to have higher power efficiency and scalability [57].
8As analog beamformers are implemented only via phase-shifters, it is typically assumed that
transmit power is split uniformly across the transmit antennas. Hence, the m-th entry of beam-
former fℓ for m ∈ [M ] is written in this case for some φℓ,m ∈ R as
fℓ,m =
1√
M
exp {jφℓ,m} . (6)
For digital beamforming, one can follow a similar approach as in TAS and employ a conventional
linear digital precoder by considering the end-to-end channels between the RF chains and the
receiving terminals, i.e., FTH. Alternatively, the digital beamformers can be designed directly
via optimizing an objective measure of performance. Let U be a metric which quantifies the
performance of the network. Such a metric is in general a function of the channel matrices,
power allocation, as well as analog and digital beamformers. Hence, for a given setting and fixed
analog beamformers, U is written as U = f (W,P). In this case, one can find the optimal digital
beamformers with respect to U by optimizing f (W,P) over the set of all possible choices.
In practice, there are various metrics for performance characterization, e.g., least squared error
(LSE), energy efficiency and achievable throughput; see studies in [59], [60] and references
therein for further discussions. Some of these metrics are optimized via computationally tractable
algorithms; however, for some others exact derivation is not tractably, and hence the beamformers
are approximated by sub-optimal algorithms. In this paper, we assume that analog and digital
beamformers are designed such that the secrecy performance is optimized. The metric with which
the secrecy performance is quantified is given later in the sequel.
D. Secrecy Performance
To guarantee secure transmission, we need to ensure that there is no information leakage from
the BS to the eavesdroppers. Considering the worst-case scenario in which the eavesdroppers are
cooperating, achievable secrecy rates are defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Achievable secrecy rate): The secrecy rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is said to be achiev-
able, if there exists a sequence of encoders fk,N :
[
2NRk
] 7→ CN and decoders φk,N : CN 7→[
2NRk
]
, indexed by N , for k ∈ [K] such that [sk (1) , . . . , sk (N)] = fk,N (uk), and
lim
N↑∞
max
k∈[K]
Pr {φk,N (yk (1) , . . . , yk (N)) 6= uk} = 0 (7a)
lim
N↑∞
1
N
I (S (u1, . . . , uK) ; z1 (1) , . . . , z1 (N) , zJ (1) , . . . , zJ (N)) = 0 (7b)
for all S (u1, . . . , uK) ⊆ {u1, . . . , uK}.
9The constraint in (7a) guarantees reliability of downlink transmissions, while (7b) enforces the
overheard signals to contain no information leakage.
For legitimate terminal k, an achievable secrecy rate is given by [20], [61], [62]
Rk (M) =
[
log
(
1 + SINRk (M)
1 + ESNRk (M)
)]+
, (8)
where SINRk (M) and ESNRk (M) are defined as follows
SINRk (M) =
Pkβk
∣∣hTkFwk∣∣2
σ2 + βk
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi
∣∣hTkFwi∣∣2
, (9a)
ESNRk (M) =
Pk
ρ2
‖
√
Θ GTFwk‖2 . (9b)
The achievability of the given secrecy rates requires the CSI of the eavesdroppers to be available
at the BS. This assumption does not necessarily hold in the network. Hence, the secrecy rates
in (8) describes the secrecy performance of the system in a superior condition in which a genie
informs the BS about the CSI of overhearing channels. It is later shown that the given secrecy
performance is achievable without knowing the eavesdroppers’ CSI.
In the absence of malicious terminals, i.e., when J = 0, the achievable secrecy rate reduces to
Rmk (M) = log (1 + SINRk (M)) (10)
which denotes the rate to user k achieved by linear precoding in the standard downlink setting
without eavesdropper. Unlike the secrecy rate, Rmk (M) is achieved via standard channel coding
which does not require to know the CSI of overhearing channels. Using this approach for downlink
transmission in a network with malicious terminals, the eavesdroppers receive some information
leakage. In (8)-(10), the number of transmit antennas, i.e., M , is denoted as an argument to
explicitly indicate the dependency of these expressions on the array size.
To quantify the secrecy performance in this network, we utilize the achievable rate in (8) and
define the following performance metric:
Definition 2 (Weighted secrecy sum-rate): The weighted achievable secrecy sum-rate is
Rsum (M) =
K∑
k=1
qk Rk (M) (11)
for some weighting coefficients q1, . . . , qK .
The weighting coefficient qk is proportional to the quality of services (QoS) desired for the
particular legitimate terminal k. For instance, when all the users are supposed to meet the same
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QoS, the weights are constant, i.e., qk = qℓ for k 6= ℓ ∈ [K]. The achievable weighted downlink
sum-rate in this case reads
Rmsum (M) =
K∑
k=1
qk R
m
k (M) . (12)
To investigate the performance of the system in the large-system limit, we take the asymptotic
limit of M ↑ ∞. This means that we consider a sequence of MIMOME settings, indexed by
M , which are consistent with the model described in this section and assume that M can grow
unboundedly large. The numbers of legitimate terminals and eavesdroppers are set fixed.
III. SECRECY FOR FREE
In MIMOME settings with large transmit arrays, the BS is able to suppress the signals received
by the eavesdroppers via narrow beamforming towards legitimate terminals. Hence, when M
grows large, Rk (M) converges to R
m
k (M) even in the presence of eavesdroppers which implies
that secrecy is obtained at no significant cost. In other words, the information leakage to the
eavesdroppers converges to zero even by employing a standard downlink transmission scheme
which ignores the malicious terminals. We refer to this property as secrecy for free and formulate
it formally in the sequel.
A. Asymptotic Secrecy For Free
Physical layer secrecy is obtained at the expense of reduction in the data rate. This can be seen
by comparing the achievable rates in (8) and (10). The comparison further indicates that the cost
depends on the quality of the channels by which the eavesdroppers overhear the transmit signal.
We quantify this cost by defining the relative secrecy cost as follows:
Definition 3 (Relative secrecy cost): Let Rsum (M) and R
m
sum (M) denote the achievable weighted
secrecy sum-rate in the presence of eavesdroppers in the network, i.e., J 6= 0, and the achievable
weighted sum-rate in the absence of eavesdroppers, i.e., J = 0, respectively. The relative secrecy
cost in the network is defined as
C (M) := 1− Rsum (M)
Rmsum (M)
, (13)
when Rmsum (M) 6= 0. The relative secrecy cost is defined to be C (M) = 0, if Rmsum (M) = 0.
C (M) quantifies the reduction in the achievable rate imposed intentionally by the BS to secure
the communication. From Definition 3, it is straightforwardly inferred that 0 ≤ C (M) ≤ 1, where
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the lower and upper bounds on C (M) are met when Rsum (M) = Rmsum (M) and Rmsum (M) 6=
Rsum (M) = 0, respectively. Following the intuitive definition, secrecy for free refers to scenarios
in which C (M) tends to the lower bound when M grows large. We hence define the concept of
asymptotic secrecy for free formally as follows:
Definition 4 (Asymptotic secrecy for free): Consider a sequence of problems indexed by M . Let
transmit power P be bounded from above. The secrecy is achieved asymptotically for free, if
lim
M↑∞
C (M) = 0. (14)
The above definition implies that, when secrecy is achieved asymptotically for free in the
network, then we have Rk (M) ≈ Rmk (M) for large transmit antenna arrays. This means that the
BS blinds the eavesdroppers without knowing the CSI of their channels. As a result, unlike the
non-asymptotic regime, in the large-system limit, the BS does not require the CSI of overhearing
channels to provide physical layer security.
From practical points of view, the scale of massiveness by which secrecy is almost for free
in the network is not directly derived from the concept of secrecy for free. In fact, to achieve
secrecy asymptotically for free, the relative secrecy cost only needs to drop monotonically with
M ; see Definition 4. Nevertheless, it is the speed of this drop which specifies the practical scale
of required system dimension. To address this concern, we further define the asymptotic decay of
secrecy cost as follows:
Definition 5 (Asymptotic decay of secrecy cost): Let C (M) denote the relative secrecy cost for a
sequence of problems indexed by M in which secrecy is achieved asymptotically for free. f (M)
is the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost if C (M) = O (1/f (M)), i.e.,
lim
M↑∞
f (M) C (M) = C0 (15)
for some bounded constant C0 ∈ R.
The asymptotic decay of secrecy cost provides an approximate metric on the number of transmit
antennas by which the system is considered massive enough to achieve secrecy almost for free. In
practice, we are interested in MIMO transmission schemes whose relative secrecy costs decay fast.
In the remaining parts of this manuscript, we investigate the concept of secrecy for free
in massive MIMOME settings with reduced complexity, analytically. To this end, we consider
the major low-complexity MIMO architectures, namely TAS and HADP. For each of these
architectures, we depict that secrecy is achieved asymptotically for free via a wide class of analog
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and digital beamforming techniques. The derivations show that using HADP a higher asymptotic
decay of secrecy cost is achievable with the same number of RF chains.
IV. SECRECY FOR FREE UNDER TAS
We start the analyses by considering TAS. It is shown that even when only a subset of transmit
antennas is set active, the relative secrecy cost converges to zero as the transmit array size grows
large. For this architecture, the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost is at least log logM which is
rather slow. In the sequel, we first state the main result. The derivation of the result is then given
in details and confirmed by some numerical simulations.
A. Main Results
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions under which secrecy is achieved asymptot-
ically for free via TAS. It further specifies a lower bound on the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost.
Proposition 1 (Secrecy for free under TAS): Assume that the BS uses only the CSI of legitimate
channels for TAS and digital beamforming. Let analog beamformers be set via a TAS protocol
which selects L ≥ K transmit antennas once per coherence time interval. Then, there exist linear
digital beamformers which achieve secrecy asymptotically for free. The asymptotic decay of secrecy
cost for this hybrid structure is at least log logM .
Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of a linear digital beamforming scheme and a TAS
protocol which is updated at the Doppler rate. The asymptotic decay of secrecy cost obtained by
this TAS transmission scheme is at least log logM . Throughout the derivations, we design a digital
beamforming scheme and a TAS protocol which secrecy is achieved asymptotically for free, and
C (M) = O (1/ log logM). Nevertheless, the result is not restricted to the proposed schemes and
is valid for superior approaches, as well.
Remark 1: It is worth to indicate that Proposition 1 provides some sufficient conditions and
does not discuss any necessary condition. This means that secrecy for free could be eventually
achievable with smaller numbers of active transmit antennas.
B. Derivations
The proof of Proposition 1 follows two major steps: First, we design linear digital beamformers,
as well as a TAS protocol whose update rate is once per coherence time interval. Then, we show
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that for the proposed beamforming technique and TAS protocol, the relative secrecy cost converges
to zero proportional to 1/ log logM . Throughout the derivations, we consider the case with exactly
L = K RF chains. The result then immediately extends the proof to cases with L ≥ K, since in
settings with L > K RF chains, one can still set only K antennas active.
TAS Protocol: At the beginning of each coherence time interval, the BS selects exactly L = K
antennas by pursuing the following steps:
1) For k ∈ [K], the BS sorts the channel gains from the transmit antennas to legitimate terminal
k in a decreasing order. This means that it finds indices ik,1, . . . , ik,M ∈ [M ], such that∣∣hk,ik,1∣∣2 ≥ . . . ≥ ∣∣hk,ik,M ∣∣2 (16)
2) It then sets antennas ℓk for k ∈ [K] active, where ℓ1 = i1,1 and ℓk = ik,tk for 2 ≤ k ≤ K.
Here, the index tk ∈ [M ] is given by
tk := argmin
a∈Wk
ik,a (17)
where
Wk := {w ∈ [M ] : ik,w 6= ℓk−b for b ∈ [k − 1]} . (18)
In a nutshell, the TAS protocol selects L = K antennas indexed by ℓk for k ∈ [K] where ℓk
denotes the antenna whose channel gain to the legitimate terminal k is strongest. If the Q strongest
antennas are already taken by other users, ℓk is set to be the Q + 1-th strongest antenna. Noting
that the antennas are selected based on the CSI of the legitimate terminals, the protocol is updated
once in a coherence time interval. Without loss of generality, we assume ℓ1 < . . . < ℓK .
Under this protocol, we have L = K analog beamformers f1, . . . , fK , where fk = e
M
ℓk
with
eMℓ ∈ RM denoting the ℓ-th principle basis vector1 of RM . For digital beamforming, we use
an MRT-based scheme in which the k-th digital beamformer contains only the matched filter
corresponding to the channel between antenna element ℓk and the k-th legitimate terminal, i.e.,
wk =
h∗k,ℓk
|hk,ℓk |
eKk .
We now show that the relative secrecy cost for the given protocol and beamformers converges to
zero asymptotically. To keep the derivations tractable, we assume that Wk = [M ] for all k ∈ [K]
meaning that the strongest antennas corresponding to different terminals are distinct. Extension
1This means that the ℓ-th entry of eMℓ is one, and the remaining entries are zero.
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to cases with overlapping strongest antennas is trivial. We start the derivations with determining
the asymptotic expansions of SINRk (M) and ESNRk (M). Noting that∣∣hTkFwi∣∣2 =
∣∣∣∣ h∗i,ℓi|hi,ℓi|hTkFeLi
∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣hTk fi∣∣2 = |hk,ℓi|2 , (19)
SINRk (M) reads
SINRk (M) =
Pkβk |hk,ℓk|2
σ2 + βkIk
(20)
where
Ik :=
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi |hk,ℓi|2 . (21)
Similarly, for ESNRk (M)
ESNRk (M) =
Pk
ρ2
‖
√
Θ GTFwk‖2 = PkEk
ρ2
(22)
where we define
Ek :=
J∑
j=1
θj |gj,ℓk|2 . (23)
To pursue the derivations, we consider the following statements:
(a) For k ∈ [K], random variable |hk,ℓk|2 reads
|hk,ℓk|2 = max
m∈[M ]
|hk,m|2 (24)
which is an order statistics of hk, often called as the extreme value of hk [63], [64]. Noting
that entries of hk are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables, the Fisher-Tippett theorem [65], [66]
indicates that as M grows large, the random variable Γk, defined as
Γk := |hk,ℓk|2 − lnM (25)
converges in distribution to a Gumbel distribution with zero location and unit scale, i.e.,
Pr (Γk ≤ γ) = exp {− exp {−γ}} . (26)
This means that for k ∈ [K]
|hk,ℓk|2
lnM
−→ 1 (27)
where −→ indicates convergence in mean square.
(b) Since hi for i 6= k are independent of hk, entries hk,ℓi are randomly selected entries, and
hence are Gaussian distributed with zero mean and unit variance. As a result, one can write
E {Ik} =
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi = P − Pk (28a)
E
{
I2k
}
=
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
P 2i +
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
K∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=k
PiPℓ =
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
P 2i + (P − Pk)2 . (28b)
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Note that
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
P 2i ≤
K∑
i=1
P 2i
†
≤ P 2, (29)
where † follows from the fact that Pi ≥ 0 for i ∈ [K]. This means that for any M , Ik is a
random variable with bounded mean E {Ik} and bounded variance
V {Ik} =
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
P 2i . (30)
(c) With the same lines of justification as in the previous statement, it is concluded that gj,ℓk are
distributed Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. Thus, we have
E {Ek} =
J∑
j=1
θj = J EF(θ) {θ} (31a)
E
{
E2k
}
=
J∑
j=1
θ2j +
(
J∑
j=1
θj
)2
= JEF(θ)
{
θ2
}
+
(
JEF(θ) {θ}
)2
. (31b)
This concludes that for any M , Ek is a random variable with bounded mean E {Ek} and
bounded variance V {Ek} = JEF(θ) {θ2}.
Using the expression derived for SINRk (M), we can write
Rmk (M) = log
(
1 +
Pkβk |hk,ℓk |2
σ2 + βkIk
)
. (32)
Statement (a) indicates that as M grows large, we have [67]
Rmk (M) −→ log
(
1 +
Pkβk lnM
σ2 + βkIk
)
(33a)
= log (lnM) + log (Pkβk)− log
(
σ2 + βkIk
)
+ log
(
1 +
σ2 + βkIk
Pkβk lnM
)
(33b)
= log (lnM) + ǫk (M) , (33c)
where from Statement (b), it is concluded that ǫk (M) = O (1).
For the achievable secrecy rate, we can further write
Rk (M) =
[
log
(
1 +
Pkβk |hk,ℓk |2
σ2 + βkIk
)
− log
(
1 +
PkEk
ρ2
)]+
. (34)
Following Statements (a)-(c), we can conclude that for any realization of the channels, there exists
M0, such that for M ≥M0
log
(
1 +
Pkβk |hk,ℓk |2
σ2 + βkIk
)
≥ log
(
1 +
PkEk
ρ2
)
(35)
with probability one. Thus, in the large-system limit, we have
Rk (M) −→ log
(
1 +
PkβklnM
σ2 + βkIk
)
− log
(
1 +
PkEk
ρ2
)
(36a)
= log (lnM) + ǫˆk (M) (36b)
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with ǫˆk (M) = O (1). As a result, the relative secrecy cost reads
C (M) −→
K∑
k=1
qkǫk (M)−
K∑
k=1
qk ǫˆk (M)
log (lnM) +
K∑
k=1
qkǫk (M)
. (37)
From (37), it concluded C (M) = O (1/ log logM). This indicates that secrecy is achieved
asymptotically for free with the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost log logM using only K active
antennas. The result ensures that the property is achievable with a larger number of RF chains,
i.e., for any L ≥ K, with at least of the same decay speed. It is worth to indicate that L ≥ K is
only a sufficient condition. From the derivations, it is observed that the proof is further extendable
to scenarios with fewer RF chains.
Remark 2: With some straightforward modifications, the proof extends to bi-unitarily invariant
channel matrices2 which cover a wide class of fading models.
C. Numerical Investigations
We now perform some numerical experiments to confirm the analytic results. To this end, we
consider two distinct scenarios: In the first scenario, the network contains K = 16 legitimate
terminals and J = 2 eavesdroppers uniformly distributed in a cell. As the number of malicious
terminals is considerably smaller than the number of legitimate users, we refer to this scenario
as the sparsely overheard network. The second scenario considers a network with K = 16 users
and J = 16 eavesdroppers. This network is referred to as the densely overheard network. In both
the networks, we assume that the BS selects L = K transmit antennas.
Throughout the investigations, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)s at legitimate and malicious
receiving terminals are defined as SNRmk := βkP/σ
2 for k ∈ [K] and SNRej := θjP/ρ2 for
j ∈ [J ], respectively. In simulations, we set P = σ2 = ρ2 = 1. It is further assumed that the
impact of path-loss and shadowing at legitimate terminals is compensated at the transmit side;
hence, we set βk = 1 for k ∈ [K]. For the eavesdroppers, we assume θi = 0.1 for j ∈ [J ]. As a
result, log SNRmk = 0 dB and log SNR
e
j = −10 dB for k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [J ].
For each of the scenarios, we provide two sets of numerical results:
2The random matrix H ∈ CM×K is bi-unitarily invariant, if for any pair of independent unitary matrices U ∈ CM×M and
V ∈ C
K×K , the entries of H and UHVH have the same distribution [68].
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Fig. 1: Achievable sum-rate and information leakage in for both the TAS schemes.
• In the first set, simulation results for the basic TAS transmission scheme, which is described
through the derivations, is given. We refer to this scheme as TAS Scheme A.
• The simulations are then performed for a benchmark TAS scheme given in [41]. In this
scheme, the active transmit antennas are selected via a step-wise approach such that the
weighted sum-rate is maximally increased in each step. For digital precoding over the selected
antennas, we use the MRT scheme. This means that wk = h˜
∗
k/‖h˜k‖, where h˜k denotes the
k-th column of FTH. We refer to this scheme as TAS Scheme B. More details of this scheme
can be found in [41].
We further assume uniform power allocation in the simulations for both the schemes, and set
q1 = . . . = qK = 1 while calculating a weighted sum-rate.
Fig. 1 sketches the achievable sum-rate, as well as the information leakage to the eavesdroppers,
against the transmit array size for both the TAS schemes. Here, the information leakage is defined
as ∆(M) := Rmsum (M)− Rsum (M). The achievable sum-rate is the same for the two networks,
as the numbers of legitimate terminals are the same in both networks.
As Fig. 1 shows, the leakage in both the schemes remains almost constant for all choices of M ,
i.e., ∆(M) = δ for some small δ. This indicates that Rmsum (M) ≈ Rsum (M), or in other words,
secrecy is achieved almost for free in this case. In the densely overheard network, the amount of
leakage is rather higher. This is due to the high density of the malicious terminals in the network.
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As a result, Rmsum (M) ≈ Rsum (M) is an accurate approximation for larger M .
Unlike the leakage, the achievable sum-rate grows with M . This observation confirms the
prior analysis. It is further seen that the achievable sum-rate in TAS Scheme B is shifted by
approximately 9 dB on the vertical axis compared to TAS Scheme A. This is as the benchmark
scheme performs superior to the basic scheme considered for derivations. It is however observable
from the figure that the order of growth is almost the same for the two schemes. Since the
information leakage is constant in M , the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost indicates that the
achievable downlink rate to each legitimate user grows in this case proportional to log logM . One
can hence write in this case
Rmsum (M) ≈ V (M) = R0 + TK log logM (38)
for some constants T and R0. For the given curves in Fig. 1, we find the values of T and R0 by
curve fitting. The resulting curves are plotted with dashed and dotted lines in the figure. As it is
seen, the curves track the numerical simulations asymptotically for both the schemes. This means
that the lower bound on the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost is also tight for other TAS schemes.
The relative secrecy cost for the given schemes are further plotted in Fig. 2 versus the array
size. Considering the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost, we can write in the large-system limit
C (M) ≈ Q (M) = ǫ0
log logM
(39)
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for some constant ǫ0. Q (M) is further plotted in both the figures for both the schemes. The value
of ǫ0 for each curve is found such that C (M0) = Q (M0) for M0 = 214. As it depicts, the fitted
curves track the simulation results.
From Fig. 2, it is observed that for achieving a desired relative secrecy cost, either a larger an-
tenna array or a more sophisticated TAS transmission scheme is required in the densely overheard
network. For instance, a relative secrecy cost around 0.15 is achieved in the sparsely overheard
network via both the schemes even with less than M = 2K = 32 transmit antennas. To achieve
such a level of secrecy cost, one requires to employ Scheme B with around M = 64K = 1024
antennas. This observation explains the impact of slow asymptotic decay. In fact under TAS, the
system performance is still sensitive to the density of eavesdroppers, and hence more sophisticated
TAS protocols and digital precoding schemes are required in networks with high density of
malicious terminals.
V. SECRECY FOR FREE UNDER HADP
We now extend the analysis to MIMO architectures with HADP. The main difference in this
case is that the analog beamformers are implemented via phase shifters instead of switches and
hence are of the form given in (6). Similar to TAS, the analysis depicts that without using the CSI
of the channels to eavesdroppers, secrecy can be achieved asymptotically for free. The relative
secrecy cost vanishes significantly faster in this case. This is a direct result of employing all the
antenna elements in HADP. The derivations interestingly show that this behavior is obtained even
by pure analog beamforming. This agrees with intuitions given earlier in Section III.
A. Main Results
Proposition 2 gives a set of sufficient conditions for achieving secrecy for free via HADP, as
well as a lower bound on the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost:
Proposition 2 (Secrecy for free under HADP): Consider an HADP architecture with L ≥ K RF
chains in which the BS uses only the CSI of the legitimate channels for analog and digital beam-
forming. Let analog beamformers be updated once per coherence time interval. Then, there exist
linear digital beamformers which achieve secrecy asymptotically for free. The asymptotic decay
of secrecy cost in this case is at least logM .
Similar to Proposition 1, this result describes sufficiency and does not discuss any necessary
condition. It further implies that with the same number of RF chains, HADP can tend the
20
relative secrecy cost to zero significantly faster than TAS. In the sequel, we give a proof for this
proposition by designing analog and digital beamformers which result in a relative secrecy cost
decaying proportional to logM . The derivations interestingly show that this property is achieved
by only performing analog beamforming. As fully digital precoding is a special case of HADP,
Proposition 2 further guarantees the asymptotic secrecy for free in fully digital massive MIMO
settings with the decay of order logM . This agrees with the earlier derivations [1], [26].
B. Derivations
The derivations follow the same approach as the one taken to prove Proposition 1. We start the
proof by setting analog and digital beamformers. In the proposed scheme, we consider architectures
with exactly L = K RF chains. The result for scenarios with L > K RF chains is then directly
concluded, since the proposed scheme can also be used in those scenarios.
HADP Scheme: Consider a hybrid architecture with exactly L = K RF chains. In the base-
band domain, the BS employs linear beamformers wk = e
K
k . The digital base-band signal is then
coupled in the RF domain using analog beamformers f1, . . . , fK whose entries for k ∈ [K] and
m ∈ [M ] read
fk,m =
1√
M
h∗k,m
|hk,m| .
In this scheme, the digital beamformers simply map the information symbol of the k-th legit-
imate terminal to the k-th entry of the base-band signal. The analog beamforming then linearly
combines the information symbols of different terminals using the corresponding channel phases.
In other words, the beamforming in this scheme is performed purely via the analog beamformers.
Considering the HADP scheme, we have
hTkFwi = hkfi =
1√
M
M∑
m=1
hk,mh
∗
i,m
|hi,m| (40)
which for i = k reduces to
hTkFwk =
1√
M
M∑
m=1
|hi,m| = ‖hk‖1√
M
. (41)
As a result, SINRk (M) for k ∈ [K] reads
SINRk (M) =
1
M
Pkβk‖hk‖21
σ2 + βkI˜k
(42)
with I˜k being defined as
I˜k =
1
M
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
hk,mh
∗
i,m
|hi,m|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (43)
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The leakage to the eavesdroppers is further given by ESNRk (M) = PkE˜k/ρ
2, where
E˜k =
1
M
J∑
j=1
θj
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
gj,mh
∗
k,m
|hk,m|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (44)
To determine the asymptotic expansion of SINRk (M) and ESNRk (M), we note the following
statements:
(a) |hk,m| for m ∈ [M ] are i.i.d. Rayleigh distributed random variables. Following the law of
large numbers (LLN), we have
1
M
‖hk‖1 −→ E {|hk,m|} =
√
π
4
. (45)
(b) For k 6= i ∈ [K], let the random sequence {Xk,i (m)} be defined as
Xk,i (m) =
hk,mh
∗
i,m
|hi,m| . (46)
Noting that hk and hi are i.i.d. vectors, it is concluded that {Xk,i (m)} is an i.i.d. sequence
whose entries have the following properties:
1) The expected value of Xk,i (m) reads
E {Xk,i (m)} = E {hk,m}E
{
h∗i,m
|hi,m|
}
= 0 (47)
2) The variance is given by
E
{|Xk,i (m)|2} = E {|hk,m|2} = 1 (48)
3) For i 6= j, the covariance between Xk,i (m) and Xk,j (m) reads
E {Xk,i (m)Xk,j (m)∗} = E
{
|hk,m|2 h∗i,mhj,m
|hi,m| |hj,m|
}
(49)
= E
{|hk,m|2}E
{
h∗i,m
|hi,m|
}
E
{
hj,m
|hj,m|
}
†
= 0 (50)
where † follows the fact that h∗i,m/|hi,m| is a uniform random variable on the unit circle.
Using the central limit theorem, it is hence concluded that random variable Sk,i, defined as
Sk,i :=
1√
M
M∑
m=1
Xk,i (m) (51)
for k 6= i ∈ [K], converges in distribution to a zero-mean and unit-variance Gaussian random
variable. Following the fact that Xk,i (m) and Xk,j (m) are uncorrelated random variables, it
is further straightforward to show that E
{
Sk,iS
∗
k,j
}
= 0. for i 6= j. This means that random
variables Sk,i for i 6= k ∈ [K] are asymptotically independent and Gaussian distributed.
(c) With the exact lines of derivations as in Statement (b), it is concluded that for j ∈ [J ]
Yk,j :=
1√
M
M∑
m=1
gj,mh
∗
k,m
|hk,m| (52)
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converge in distribution independent Gaussian variables with zero mean and unit variance.
From Statement (b), we can write
I˜k =
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi |Sk,i|2 (53)
whose mean reads
E
{
I˜k
}
=
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi = P − Pk. (54)
Its variance is further given by
V
{
I˜k
}
=
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
P 2i +
(
K∑
i=1,i 6=k
Pi
)2
−
∣∣∣E {I˜k}∣∣∣2 = K∑
i=1,i 6=k
P 2i ≤ P 2. (55)
This indicates that I˜k, for anyM , is a random variable with bounded mean and variance. Similarly
by using Statement (c), we have
E˜k =
J∑
j=1
θj |Yk,j|2 . (56)
The mean and variance of E˜k are hence straightforwardly calculated as
E
{
E˜k
}
= JEF(θ) {θ} (57a)
V
{
E˜k
}
= JEF(θ)
{
θ2
}
(57b)
which are bounded for any M .
We now utilize Statement (a) and write
1
M
SINRk (M) =
Pkβk
σ2 + βkI˜k
(‖hk‖1
M
)2
−→ Pkβk
σ2 + βkI˜k
π
4
(58)
for some realization of I˜k. Noting that I˜k has bounded mean and variance, we can conclude that
as M grows large
SINRk (M) = Γ˜kM + ǫ˜k (M) (59)
where Γ˜k is a bounded constant with probability one, and ǫ˜k (M) = O (1). For ESNRk (M), we
can further use the fact that E˜k has bounded mean and variance and write
ESNRk (M) = ǫ˘k (m) (60)
for large M , where ǫ˘k (m) = O (1) with probability one.
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Using the asymptotic expansion of SINRk (M) and ESNRk (M), it is concluded that for any
realization of the channels, there exist some M0, such that for M > M0, the secrecy rate is
non-zero. As a result, the relative secrecy cost reads
C (M) −→
K∑
k=1
qk log (ǫ˘k (m))
K∑
k=1
qk log
(
Γ˜kM + ǫ˜k (M)
) . (61)
This concludes Proposition 2.
C. Numerical Investigations
In this section, we provide some numerical simulations to confirm our earlier derivations. In
this respect, we consider the sparsely and densely overheard networks described in Section IV-C.
These networks are equipped with K = 16 legitimate users, where in the former J = 2, and
in the latter J = 16. We assume that the hybrid architecture contains L = K RF chains. The
transmit power, noise variance, and channel coefficients are set similar to Section IV-C, such that
log SNRmk = 0 dB and log SNR
e
j = −10 dB for k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [J ].
In the sequel, we investigate two HADP schemes in each of the considered networks:
• First, we give numerical results for the basic HADP transmission scheme used for derivation
of Proposition 2. We refer to this scheme as Scheme A.
• The investigations are then extended to a benchmark HADP scheme. To this end, we consider
the low-complexity HADP scheme proposed in [46]. In this scheme, the analog beam-
formers are set proportional to the quantized phase of the channel vectors, i.e., fk,m =
exp {−jφk,m} /
√
M for k ∈ [K] and m ∈ [M ], where φk,m is the phase of hk,m quantized
via the least-squares method using B bits. The digital beamformers are then given via zero
forcing (ZF) precoding over the effective channels, i.e., FTH. More detailed discussions on
this HADP scheme can be followed in [46]. This scheme is referred to as Scheme B.
For sake of simplicity, we assume uniform power allocation in these schemes and set q1 = . . . =
qK = 1 throughout the simulations.
Fig. 3 shows the achievable sum-rate, as well as the information leakage in the network, against
the array size M for HADP Scheme A. As the figure shows, the information leakage remains
constant in M . Comparing the results with the counterpart TAS architecture, one observes a
significant performance gain in this case. This follows the fact that the achievable rate to each
legitimate terminal under HADP grows proportional to logM which is significantly faster than the
24
102 103 104
0
40
80
120
Array size M
R
at
e
in
[b
it
s/
se
c/
H
z]
∆(M), Sparse Net
∆(M), Dense Net
Rm
sum
(M)
V˜ (M)
Fig. 3: Achievable sum-rate and information leakage for HADP Scheme A.
growth speed under TAS, i.e., log logM . As a result, the approximation Rmsum (M) ≈ Rsum (M)
is accurate at smaller values of M in this case. The secrecy cost decaying speed implies that
Rmsum (M) ≈ V˜ (M) = R˜0 + T˜K logM (62)
for some constants R˜0 and T˜ . For the result given in Fig. 3 this asymptotic curve is numerically
fitted. As it is seen, the fitted curve tracks closely the simulations.
The resulting cost function for the scenario in Fig. 3 is plotted in Fig. 4. Similar to the previous
figure, we use the asymptotic expansion and write the large-system approximation
C (M) ≈ Q˜ (M) = ǫ˜0
logM
(63)
for some constant ǫ˜0. The fitted curves are further shown in the figure. As it is observed, the
curves give better approximations at large values of M .
Similar to the scenarios with TAS, the increase in the density of malicious terminals in the
network results in higher information leakage. Comparing this degradation in secrecy performance
under TAS and HADP, the latter shows less sensitivity to the density of the malicious terminals
in the network. This is, as in HADP all the transmit antennas are active. As a result, the analog
beamformers can construct narrower downlink beams compared to the transmitters which use
purely digital beamforming with TAS.
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The simulation results for Scheme B are further given in Figs. 5 and 6 considering various
numbers of bits for quantization of phase-shifts in analog beamformers. In Fig. 5, the achievable
sum-rate and the information leakage are plotted against the array size. The figure shows, the
achievable rate, in this case for the benchmark scheme with infinite quantization accuracy B ↑ ∞,
is improved compared to the basic scheme. This is due to the fact that Scheme B performs digital
precoding in addition to analog beamforming. ∆(M) however remains unchanged in this case.
Fig. 5 further shows the performance for more practical scenarios with finite quantization
accuracy, namely B = 2 and B = 4. From the figure one can see that low-resolution quantization
only shifts the achievable sum-rate and does not change the asymptotic decay of secrecy cost. For
the information leakage, quantization does not result in any sensible change which is intuitive. In
fact, quantization only introduces performance degradation. Since with high-resolution quantizers,
the information leakage is close to zero, further degradation is not negligible in this case.
The higher achievable sum-rate in Scheme B results in lower secrecy costs. This is shown
in Fig. 6 where we sketch the relative secrecy cost against the array size for the sparsely and
densely overheard networks, respectively. Comparing the variations in the two figures against the
benchmark scheme under the TAS approach, one observes that the system in this case is less
sensitive to the density of eavesdroppers.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Secrecy is achieved at almost no cost in MIMOME settings with large transmit arrays. We
call this property secrecy for free and find that it is generic. This means that regardless of the
transceiver architecture, the achievable downlink rate to the legitimate users remains almost the
same in the presence or absence of malicious terminals, when the number of transmit antennas is
large enough. Despite the generality of this property, the decaying speed of the information leakage
per achievable rate varies from one architecture to another. Our investigations have demonstrated
that using a conventional HADP scheme, this ratio converges to zero significantly faster than
MIMOME settings which utilize TAS for RF cost reduction. Noting that HADP schemes with
low-resolution quantized phase shifters are more trivial to implement, it is concluded that HADP
is an effective hybrid architecture for massive MIMO implementation in practice.
The derivations in this work have been given for downlink transmission schemes which do
not use the CSI of overhearing channels. The results hence imply that in massive MIMOME
settings, physical layer security is achieved even without taking the malicious terminals into
account for system design. In other words, even by using conventional channel coding techniques,
eavesdroppers can be effectively suppressed via good downlink beamformers. This agrees with
the intuition from the favorable propagation property which indicates that proper beamforming
via large transmit arrays can almost blind all other receiving terminals in the network.
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The current work can be extended in various respects. A natural direction is to study available
HADP designs to find out the most effective approach which achieves rather small secrecy
cost at practical dimensions. To this end, one needs to extend the derivations to other channel
models, e.g. the models proposed for mmWave communications. Although such studies seem to
be straightforward extensions of this work, they give more insights on the secrecy performance
of massive MIMO systems with practical dimensions.
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